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I. INTRODUCTION

Why should a reassessment of Mr. Justice Bradley be appropriate today, almost a century after his death? A generation ago,
the only major scholar to study his career-Charles Fairmanconsistently described him as a great Justice.' More recently, a
poll of legal scholars drawn from law schools and history and
political science departments ranked him as among the "near
great."12 How does Bradley compare with other Justices usually
described as great, such as Holmes or Brandeis? Have some of
his opinions, for example, endured as landmarks of jurisprudence? On a more fundamental level, granting honesty of character as well as an innate sense of fairness, what else is required
to make a greatJustice? The term "great" as applied by one generation may have little relevance for another. For us, perhaps, a
great Justice is one whose decisions have continued validity, vitality, and significance for our time, one whose insights and doctrines continue to serve as living guideposts for American
constitutionalism, rather than as anachronistic examples of what
was, to be included of necessity in a casebook or treatise. Measured by these criteria, what can be said today about Bradley the
man, the lawyer, and the Justice?
II. BACKGROUND
Because this article is part of a symposium evaluating the
* B.A., cum laude, Harvard College; M.A., Harvard University; Ph.D., University
of Wisconsin. Professor of History and Adjunct Professor of Law, Rutgers University. I am grateful to Professor Michal Belknap, Dean Elizabeth F. Defeis, her staff,
and the librarians of Seton Hall University Law School for facilitating the research
on which this paper is based. I am also indebted to Marie-Laurence Mancini for her
very helpful editing of this article.
I See Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme Court and the Legal
Tender Cases (pts. 1 & 2), 54 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1128 (1941) [hereinafter cited as
Bradley'sAppointment]; Fairman, The Education ofaJustice: Justice Bradley and Some ofHis
Colleagues, 1 STAN. L. REV. 217 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Education of a Justice];
Fairman, What Makes a GreatJustice? Mr. Justice Bradley and the Supreme Court, 18701892, 30 B.U.L. REV. 46 (1950) [hereinafter cited as GreatJustice]. All serious study
of Bradley must begin with these articles by Charles Fairman.
2 H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINT-

MENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 289 app. A (2d ed. 1985).
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contributions to the United States Supreme Court by its four
New Jersey Justices, it would be fitting if we could begin this discussion of Mr. Justice Bradley by noting how important this state
was to his youth. Unfortunately, the truth appears to be that
Bradley did not venture onto NewJersey soil until 1833, when he
entered Rutgers College.3 Prior to that time, Eastern New York
was his home. He was born near Albany, New York in 1813; he
was the oldest of twelve children. 4 His early years were typical of
large farm families, replete with "plowing ... clearing land and

burning wood, carting bark to the tanneries and peddling charcoal at Albany, ' ' 5 sixteen miles away. His formal education prior
to college seems to have resulted mostly from his own initiative.6
Bradley recalled many years later that prior to college, he had
"but small time for reading or study. For [one] ever filled with a
burning thirst for knowledge it was an irksome life." 7 By 1831,
having concluded that his "life was being wasted, [and] [t]hat
what [he] was doing amounted to nothing," he decided to go to
New York City to work.8
Bradley never got to New York City. Apparently, the boat he
intended to take left a few minutes early because of freezing temperatures. Indeed, the river froze before morning, leaving him
stranded in Albany where he spent a few days listening to debates
in the state legislature and "poring over coveted volumes in the
State Library." ' Upon his return home, the future judge met one
of his former teachers, a member of the Reformed Dutch
Church.' 0 Sensing potential in his old student, the minister
tutored him and arranged his admission to Rutgers College in
September, 1833." Had he been able to get on the boat, Bradley
later claimed, "he would have become a grocer in New York."' 2
See Bradley's Appointment, supra note 1, at 980-81.
Id. at 980.
5 Id.
6 Friedman,JosephP. Bradley, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1182 (L. Friedman & F.
Israel eds. 1969).
7 Bradley's Appointment, supra note 1, at 981 (footnote omitted).
8 Education ofa Justice,supra note 1, at 224-25. (quotingJ. Bradley, Fragments of
an Autobiography) (unpublished book written for his children). Bradley stated that
he planned to "get a clerkship ... return to Albany, enter the academy and conquer
an education!" Id. at 225.
3

4

9 Id.
10

Id. at 226.

I1 Friedman, supra note 6, at 1182.
12

Id.
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Older and poorer than most in his class at Rutgers, 3 Bradley
intended to study theology, but subsequently abandoned it in
favor of general studies. 4 According to his own account, his diligence was noteworthy. 15 He demonstrated marked ability in
math, "mastered a vast amount of other reading and soon commenced writing for the press." 16 During his senior year (he graduated from Rutgers in three years), he was involved in what
Charles Fairman called "a great constitutional struggle"' 17 concerning the Philoclean Literary Society. The society, of which
Bradley was a member, had adopted "a resolution expressing
'the greatest contempt [for] the practice lately become common
of carrying tales to the Faculty of the bad conduct of individuals.' "18 The faculty took umbrage at such a step, concluding that
such a resolution was "dangerous to the government of the college."' 9 Bradley represented the society before both the faculty
and the board of trustees. 20 Ultimately, by a two-vote majority,
the Philocleans decided to rescind the resolution, insisting at the
same time upon "the right to express any opinion not in conflict
with the laws and regulations of the college. "21
"Joe Bradley," Fairman correctly concluded, "was a desperately serious young man."' 2 2 Note his solemn pledge: "I will not,
by any means, or on any account whatever, except it be from absolute necessity, call at any of the public houses, of this city for
the purpose of getting refreshment, refectory, or trash of any
kind except oysters, during my collegiate course. "23
id.
Education of a Justice, supra note 1, at 227.
15 See id. (citingJ. Bradley, Fragments of an Autobiography).
16 Id. (quoting J. Bradley, Fragments of an Autobiography).
17 Id. at 228.
18 Id. (quotingJ. Bradley, Fragments of an Autobiography). The members insisted that they could "NEVER consent to relinquish those rights which NATURE
ha[d] given [them] and which [they] ha[d] never voluntarily conveyed away." Id. at
229 (quotingJ. Bradley, Fragments of an Autobiography).
19 Id. at 228 (quotingJ. Bradley, Fragments of an Autobiography).
20 Id.
21 Id. (quotingJ. Bradley, Fragments of an Autobiography).
22 Id. at 229.
23 Id. (quoting J. Bradley, Fragments of an Autobiography). In a similar vein
were his comments upon receiving his degree:
I see my companions, classmates, my competitors so long . . .distinguished in their professions, beloved for their virtues, respected for
their talents ...I see myself far behind, toiling with both hands to keep
a station & a name, but sinking under the task & dying young & forgotten in the middle of my course ....
Id. (quotingJ. Bradley, Fragments of an Autobiography).
13 See
14 See
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Bradley graduated in the class of 1836 with two close friends
who would later be of great assistance when he was named to the
Court-Frederick Frelinghuysen, destined to become both a
United States Senator and a Secretary of State, and Cortland
Parker, who would be one of the leaders of the New Jersey Bar as
well as a president of the American Bar Association.24 It was at
their insistence that Bradley left the teaching job he had obtained
prior to graduation, became a clerk in the office of the collector
for the Port of Newark, and began to "read law. ' 25 In November
1836, he began his studies again, largely with himself as the
instructor.26
In reading Fairman's description of Bradley's Rutgers education, as well as his self-taught legal studies, one cannot help but
compare academic education today to that of the 1830's. Fairman notes that "the simple college studies of Bradley's day seem
to have had a coherence, a consistency, a hardness that we have
in a measure lost."'2 7 Liberal arts subjects as taught today, he

implies, are not "as tough as the calculus and the Aeneid on
which Bradley and his contemporaries were raised."' 28 Certainly

the way in which the would-be lawyer approached his legal education is striking. Bradley stated:
Of course we mastered Blackstone, and Kent. Sellon's Practice I studied with the New Jersey Statute book and reports
constantly in my hand, so as to know how the English practice
and pleadings were modified by New Jersey legislation and usages. Stephen's first Edition of Pleading I had by heart.
Mitford's Equity Pleading was also thoroughly mastered....
Chitty on Bills and Contracts were largely read and many of
the articles in Bacon's Abridgement. I never read any other
work on real estate systematically through besides
29
Blackstone ....

The thoroughness with which the new lawyer approached his work
is indicated by a typical entry in his manuscript notes on legal sub-

jects. 30 One entry on emancipation cites five different sources, one
in Latin, two in French, and two in English."' Besides doing intenId. at 227.
Id. at 230.
Id.
GreatJustice, supra note 1, at 55.
Id. at 54.
Education of ajustice, supra note 1, at 230 (quotingJ. Bradley, Fragments of an
Autobiography).
30 Id. at 232.
24
25
26
27
28
29

31

Id. at 233.
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sive work on the common law, he studied Roman law, admiralty, and
maritime jurisdiction. 3 2 There is little reason to disagree with Fairman's observation that "Bradley, the product of the one-room
school and the one-building college3 entered
upon his professional
3
life with a mind of tempered steel."
For the next thirty years (1839-1869), Bradley's life centered
around Newark. Although his legal practice expanded, Bradley did
not confine all his energies to the law. For a time, he served as a
legislative correspondent for the Newark Daily Advertiser.3" He also
worked in the insurance business, taking a job with a newly established company, Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, as an actuary.3 5 He remained with Mutual Benefit for twelve years. 6
Gradually, Bradley became acquainted with numerous leaders of the
burgeoning Newark business and legal community. Along the way,
he married the daughter of the chief justice of the New Jersey
Supreme Court 3 7- not a bad choice for one determined'38through
"toiling with both hands to keep a station [and] a name."
While Bradley had numerous clients, the most notorious was
the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company, which he served both
as counsel and as a member of its board of directors for over twenty
years. 3 ' Because his railroad was more successful than others in securing "benefits" from the New Jersey Legislature, through what
the railroad called "hospitality to legislators," some contemporary
observers probably viewed Bradley as a spokesman for "wholesale
political pressure and bribery," an area in which the railroad had an
apparently justified reputation for "being one of the worst offenders."" Indeed, he became well-known as a railroad lawyer, arguing
cases for his clients before the Supreme Court of the United States
as well as the NewJersey Supreme Court.4 ' Given his later judicial
interpretation of the commerce clause, some of his contentions as
Id. at 234-35.
GreatJustice, supra note 1, at 55.
34 See Friedman, supra note 6, at 1183.
35 Great Justice, supra note 1, at 58. It might be noted that Bradley's interest in
mathematics was enduring. Long after he had joined the Supreme Court, he would
find relief from difficult legal issues by tackling an intricate mathematical problem.
See Parker, Mr. Justice Bradley of the United States Supreme Court, in 11 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE NEW JERSEY HISTORICAL SOCIETY 158 (2d ser. 1892).
36 Great Justice, supra note 1, at 58.
37 Friedman, supra note 6, at 1183.
38 Education of ajustice, supra note 1, at 229.
39 Friedman, supra note 6, at 1183.
40 Id.
41 Id.
32

33
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42
an attorney are of interest.
In 1863, Bradley testified before Congressional committees in
strong opposition to the creation of an additional railroad line that
would run between New York and Washington.4" Defending his railroad from competition, even though the proposed new route was
supported by the Federal Government, Bradley insisted that the monopoly on transportation, which the state legislature had granted
the Camden and Amboy, was beyond Federal reach.4 4 He maintained that the authority "of Congress to create a road across a state
was at best doubtful: 'It has been claimed; it has been resisted; it
has been disused; and the non-user has been acquiesced in by the
general sentiment of the country.'-4"
A somewhat conservative Whig in a normally Democratic business community, Bradley and the railroad he so ably represented
were drawn into the Civil War soon after the surrender of Fort Sumter. When troops from Massachusetts moved south to defend
Washington, he immediately and successfully urged that all of the
railroad equipment be placed "at the disposal of the Government."4 6 Changing from a Whig to a Unionist to a Republican by
1862, Bradley even agreed to run for Congress (a hopeless candidacy given the strong Democratic leanings of the district).4 7 His
vigorous rhetoric reflected President Abraham Lincoln and Senator
Charles Sumner, and indeed, anticipated some of the legal issues of
the Reconstruction era.
In view of his later judicial decisions concerning the former
slaves, some of his points (even allowing for the campaign context)
are noteworthy. During a speech given in October of 1862, he described himself as having always been "a conservative of the conservatives," '4 8 whose goal was to uphold the Constitution at all

42 See Bradley's Appointment, supra note 1, at 983. Charles Fairman states that "a
counsel retained to defend the interests of this monopoly, perhaps the greatest
existing obstruction to interstate transportation, Bradley frequently propounded
views quite at variance with those judicial opinions which later distinguished him as
the vindicator of the commerce clause." Id.
43 Id. at 984-85.
44 Id. at 983-84. Bradley expressed this idea of state sovereignty by stating that
"Congress cannot plant its foot upon the soil of the State. The roads and police
system and the bridge system of the country belong to the State entirely." Id. at
984 (quoting manuscript of Bradley's oral argument before the New Jersey Court
of Errors & Appeals).
45 Id. at 984-85 (footnote omitted).
46 GreatJustice, supra note 1, at 57.
47 See Bradley's Appointment, supra note 1, at 988.
48 MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF THE LATE HON. JOSEPH P. BRADLEY 130 (1902)
[hereinafter cited as MISCELLANEOUS WRITNGS]. Bradley stated that "[b]ecause we
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costs-including civil war.4 9 As for the conduct of the war, Bradley
believed it should be waged like any other war, "by taking the ships
of the enemy... without compensation; by taking the horses of the
enemy without compensation; yea, by taking their lives without compensation." 5 0 Bradley concluded his speech by referring to the war
as "a holy cause-the cause of civil freedom-the cause of human
rights. In saying this, [he was not referring] to the question of domestic slavery; [he was] speaking of the great mission of this country[,] ... a mission of civil freedom and free institutions."5

Six days

later, he stated that the overriding duty of government and citizens
alike was "[t]o put down the rebellion cost what it may ....
That's the
great principle which animates us to-day. That's the pole star of our
political principles. The rebellion must be put down. Nothing else must
be thought of."5 2
It should be clearly understood that Bradley's speeches reflected an attitude widely held in the North, especially in the areas
that still supported the Democratic party. With the exception of the
"radical" abolitionists, voters had little difficulty endorsing the end
of slavery and the survival of the Union, while at the same time foreseeing no change whatsoever in racial attitudes toward minorities.
In these two speeches, for example, there was no direct reference to
the issue of freeing the slaves, let along to racial equality. Indeed,
Bradley went out of his way to emphasize that he did not
justify the intemperate language used by some Northern fanatics. I never did justify it. I have always thought it wrong in
principle. I am speaking the sentiments of all conservative
men, and I say we were always willing to concede to the South
all their just rights-the entire control and regulation of their
own affairs. The Constitution gives us no power to meddle
with3 them, no more than it gives them power to meddle with
5

US.

Like many Republicans, Bradley supported the adoption and
ratification of both the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, and
with them, the inescapable conclusion that abolition of slavery had
merged with saving the Union to become the twin goals of the
... have discarded the idea of compromise when compromise is no longer practicable, . . . we are called abolitionists ....
Is this fair?" Id. at 131.
49 See id. at 130-31. Bradley stated that he wanted to "[s]ee [the] Constitution
stand just as it is, word for word and letter for letter.... I do not want it altered; I

do not want it violated." Id. at 131.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 137.
52 Id. at 145.
53 Id. at 143-44.
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war. 54 Yet this fact was fully compatible with the views expressed in
his speech; views that remained a part of his outlook long after he
had joined the Court. It does not seem unreasonable then, to conclude that some of the seeds later to flower in his 1883 decision
against the Civil Rights Act were present in his campaign for Congress and reflected in his speeches given more than twenty years
before. Bradley did not change his mind in 1883; rather, he remained consistent.
By 1869, Bradley was a logical candidate for selection to the
United States Supreme Court. He was at the height of his legal career, and he had the open support of Mr. Justice Grier, who, after
many false starts, was finally about to retire.5 5 With the Congressional decision to restore the ninth seat to the Court, Grant would
have two appointments within his first year as President.5 6 There is7
5
no doubt that by 1869, Bradley was interested in a judicial post.

Furthermore, he had gathered endorsements from a broad spectrum of political figures, including both New Jersey Senator John
Stockton and Stockton's predecessor, Frederick Frelinghuysen,
Bradley's old Rutgers classmate.5 8
Nevertheless, Grant offered his first two Supreme Court nominations to his current Attorney General, E. Rockwood Hoar, and
Lincoln's former Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton.5 9 Within ten
days of Hoar's nomination, however, the Senate Judiciary Committee "reported adversely" on the appointment, and the formal Senate rejection soon followed. 6" In addition, the tensions of war and
54 See generally Friedman, supra note 6, at 1184 (Bradley was in favor of the abolition of slavery as early as 1860).
55 See id.
56 See generally A. KELLY, W. HARBISON & H. BELZ, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION:

ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS 370 (6th ed. 1983). In 1862, Congress increased
the size of the Supreme Court from nine to ten. Id. In 1866, it reduced the size
from ten to seven; however, vacancies on the Court further reduced that number to
six. See id. While there were still eight Justices sitting in 1869, Congress changed
the number back to nine. Id. This action and a resignation gave Grant two appointments. Id.
57 See generally Bradley's Appointment, supra note 1, at 1006-12.

See id. at 1010-12.
59 See Friedman, supra note 6, at 1185-86.
60 Bradley's Appointment, supra note 1, at 1007-08. A man of integrity, Hoar had
refused to cooperate with powerful Republican Congressmen concerning matters
of party patronage. See id. at 1008-09 & n.73. The resulting antagonism contributed largely to his rejection by the Senate committee, and while the full Senate did
not formally follow suit until February 1870, there was no doubt that the nomination was doomed. See id. at 1008. Hoar's treatment may be contrasted with that
accorded Stanton, who was nominated on December 20th and confirmed the same
day. See id.
58
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the turmoil of Reconstruction had taken too heavy a toll on Stanton's health-he died four days after being confirmed. 6 ' Again,
Grant had two appointments open. On February 7, 1870, he nominated Judge William Strong from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
and Joseph Bradley.6"
In terms of legal intellect and learning, Bradley was the most
distinguished and able of Grant's four appointments to the Court.
The favorable Senate reaction to his nomination 63 stands in marked
contrast to the difficulties Grant later encountered in his efforts to
appoint a new Chief Justice. His first choice, Roscoe Conkling, was
described by a fellow Republican as one with a "grandiloquent
swell," joined to a "majestic, super-eminent, overpowering turkeygobbler strut. ' ' 64 A notorious political figue, Conkling declined the
appointment, whereupon Grant turned to his current Attorney General, George Williams. 6 5 This nomination, from the viewpoint of
the Springfield Republican, "surprised and disgusted every lawyer in
the United States who has the honor of his profession at heart."6 6
Forced to withdraw the nomination, Grant's third choice was an eccentric, seventy-four-year-old former Attorney General and Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice, Caleb Cushing. 67 According to the
Nation, Grant had at last "entered the small circle of eminent lawyers, and then with great care ha[d] chosen the worst man in it."' 68
Compelled to withdraw yet his third choice, the President selected Morrison R. Waite, described a little unfairly as a "respectable mediocrity, ' 69 who had "every requisite except repute."7 The
general consensus among the press appeared to be that Grant had
finally made an acceptable, if somewhat uninspired, choice. 7 ' Per61 See id.
62 Id. at 1009.
63 See id. at 1034 (Bradley was confirmed by a vote of 46 to
64 M. JOSEPHSON, THE POLITICOS: 1865-1896, at 178 (1938).

9).
The Springfield Republican referred to Conkling as "this Senatorial railway attorney, this small-beer
statesman, this toad-eater in ordinary to the Administration, this Snarleyow of the
stump." C. FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT: 1862-1890, at
258 (1939).
65 C. FAIRMAN, supra note 64, at 258-59.
66 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 555 (1947)
(footnote omitted).
67 See id. at 557.
68 Id. at 558.
69 F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND
WAITE 77 (1937, reprint 1978) (footnote omitted).
70 C. P. MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER 16 (1963)
(footnote omitted).
71 See 2 C. WARREN, supra note 66, at 560-61. The Springield Republican stated
that Grant had "with remarkable skill avoided choosing any first rate man. ...
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haps the last word on Waite's speedy confirmation by a vote of sixtythree to six came from the first of Grant's choices to be rejected, E.
Rockwood Hoar. "Waite," he noted enviously, was "that luckiest of
all individuals known to the law, ...
an innocent third party without
notice."72

On the same day that Grant nominated both Strong and Bradley, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Hepburn v. Griswold,7 3 which held the 1862 and 1863 currency statutes to be
unconstitutional."4 The Government's prompt move for reconsideration after the two new Justices had formally joined the Court, together with the resulting five-to-four vote reversing the earlier
holding,7 5 led to a charge that Grant had packed the Court with two
Justices he knew to be sound on the money question.7 6 As Charles
Fairman has conclusively demonstrated, however, the accusation of
Court packing in this context is nonsense. 7 7 Virtually all Republicans supported the Legal Tender Act. 78 As a member of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Strong had already affirmed its
constitutionality, while Bradley's position was well-known before his
nomination. 79 In 1868, Bradley had actively and successfully campaigned as a Republican elector pledged to Grant, specifically supporting "the National legal tender." 8 Of course Grant, as with
most of our Presidents, appointed judges whom he conceived to be
sympathetic to his policies. 8 ' That he was right in his choices con[C]onsidering what the President might have done and tried to do, we ought to be
very thankful and give Mr. Waite a cordial welcome.... Contrasting what is, with
what might have been, we congratulate the... country upon its good fortune." Id.
at 561 (footnote omitted).
72 Id. "Verily," opined the Chicago Times, "the shades ofJay, and Marshall, and
Taney, and Chase may arise to protest against a profanation of this venerated seat
by a man so utterly incapable of filling it acceptably." C.P. MAGRATH, supra note 70,
at 17.
73 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869).
74 Id. at 625-26.
75 See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553 (1870) (holding currency
statutes to be constitutional "so far as they apply to contracts made before their
enactment").
76 See Bradley's Appointment, supra note 1, passim.
77 See id.
78 See Friedman, supra note 6, at 1186.
79 See id.
80 See Bradley's Appointment, supra note 1, at 989.
81 Fairman notes that Grant's attitude toward Bradley was similar to that reflected by Lincoln when he had nominated Salmon Chase to succeed Roger B. Taney as ChiefJustice: "We cannot ask a man what he will do, and if we should, and
he should answer us, we should despise him for it. Therefore we must take a man
whose opinions are known." Bradley's Appointment, supra note 1, at 1142 (footnote
omitted).
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cerning the legal tender issue in no way makes those appointees accessories to Court packing.
Although much of the remainder of this article focuses on Mr.
Justice Bradley, some attention must be given to the most controversial nonjudicial episode during his tenure on the Court-his role in
the resolution of the disputed 1876 Presidential election between
Samuel Tilden and Rutherford Hayes. 8 2 Only minimal factual background is needed here. With the House and the Senate unable to
agree on the counting of the electoral votes, the ultimate legal solution was the creation of a fifteen member electoral commission. 8 3 It
was to consist of five members from the House (three Democrats
and two Republicans), five from the Senate (three Republicans and
two Democrats), and five Justices of the Supreme Court (two
Republicans, two Democrats, and a fifth Justice, David Davis of Illinois, widely regarded as an independent in the real sense of that
term). 84 Before the legislation establishing the commission had
cleared the Senate, however, Davis resigned to become a new Senator from Illinois.8 5 Bradley was than chosen as the fifthJustice, joining Democrats Field and Clifford and Republicans Miller and
Strong.8 6
There is no doubt that the seven Democrats supported Bradley's selection to the electoral commission. Bradley was expected to
break what was widely regarded as an inevitable deadlock, 87 and that
is exactly what happened. Bradley voted with his fellow Republicans
on every question, and the commission awarded Hayes all the disputed electoral votes, thus giving him a sufficient margin to win the
election .88

For reasons not altogether clear, Bradley was severely criticized
for his role on the commission.8 9 It is difficult to see why he was
expected to do anything other than what he did. For some reason,
many Democrats regarded Bradley as one whose political views
were closely attuned to those of their party.9" All the Democratic
Senators voting on his confirmation had supported him. 9 ' His polit82

See Friedman, supra note 6, at 1191.

83 See id.

See
Id.
86 See
87 See
88 See
84
85

id.
id.
id.
id.

89 See generally Friedman, supra note 6, at 1191-94 (general discussion concerning
the controversy surrounding Bradley's role on the commission).
90 See id. at 1191.
91 Bradley's Appointment, supra note 1, at 1034.
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ical allegiance was clear, however. He had been a Republican for
years, he had been nominated by a Republican President, and he
had participated widely in Republican party politics. Perhaps the
problem arose from the doubt and confusion concerning the creation of the commission in the first place. No one could be sure what
would happen; whatever he did, there is no way Bradley could have
satisfied both sides. Why then, was he so widely criticized for doing
exactly what all the other commission members had done-vote
along their own party lines?
Part of the problem appears to be uncertainty concerning
whether or not he changed his mind on the issue of the Florida electoral votes. According to a leading Democratic figure, Abram Hewitt, Bradley had decided on February 8, 1877 to vote with the
Democrats, which would give the Florida electoral votes (and the
White House) to Samuel Tilden.9 2 During the late evening hours,
however, two old friends of Bradley (Frelinghuysen, who was a Republican member of the commission, and George Robeson-both
staunch supporters of Bradley's appointment to the Supreme Court)
allegedly visited him.9 3 Whatever actually happened during that
visit will probably never be known. There is no doubt, however,
that at the next meeting of the commission, Bradley voted with the
Republicans."
James Scovel, a controversial maverick among New Jersey Democrats, wrote to Samuel Tilden on February 10, 1877 about Bradley's "doubts." 9 5 The Justice, according to Scovel, had told him on
January 30th that the "Commission would decide in favor of
Tilden." 9 6 Scovel stated: "Robeson... and the whole cabinet will
'bulldoze' Bradley if they can. His heart is right if they don't seduce
him from the paths ofjustice."9 7 Scovel further observed that Bradley was "intensely ambitious [and] very sensitive to public
opinion." 9 8
It is difficult to assess the credence that should be given to
Scovel's comments. As a New Jersey state senator, he had frequently clashed with Bradley's client, the Camden and Amboy Rail92

Friedman, supra note 6, at 1191-92.

93 See id.
at 1192.

Id.at 1191.
95 See Letter from J.M. Scovel to S.J. Tilden (Feb. 10, 1877) (available in New
York Public Library). I am grateful to my friend and colleague, Professor William
Gillette, for making this source known to me.
94

96

Id.

97

Id.
Id.

98
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road. 9 9 Indeed, in a letter to Senator Charles Sumner, he had
opposed Bradley's nomination to the Supreme Court, stating that
"[a]s a Lawyer he will not do-because he is heart, mind & soul, Camden & Amboy. . . . No man whose business is buying members 0of0
legislatures & paying cash for them is fit for the Supreme Bench."1
Later, according to Fairman, Scovel wrote to Bradley, telling him
how "he had used his influence with Sumner in Bradley's behalf."' 0 '
Although Scovel's veracity remains very much in doubt, Bradley's own denial of the claim that he suddenly caved in to Republican pressure is in itself not totally convincing. In a letter to the
Newark Advertiser dated September 5, 1877, the Justice firmly denied2
that anyone had visited him during the evening of February 8th.'O
He further insisted that he had "sedulously sought to avoid all discussion outside the commission itself."' 3 Frelinghuysen, however, was a
member of the commission, and Bradley did not deny that he had
talked to him about the Florida electoral votes.'0 4 Perhaps the most
accurate contemporary comment on the episode came from the Nation in its issue of September 13, 1877: "The best he can do is to
trust in silence to his character for vindication, and this is what
Judge Bradley should have done. None of his defences [sic] have
satisfied anybody who doubted him.... The result is, however, that
the judge stands just where he stood before he wrote his letter,
...
but with considerable loss of dignity." 1 0 5 As the years passed, Bradley responded to further comments about the controversy with a
blend of Olympian aloofness, self-righteousness, and self-pity. In
1882, he wrote:
If I have the ill-fortune to be unjustly judged, I am not the first
who has been in that predicament. We must take the world as
it is, and having done what we conceived to be our duty, trust
than any that rules the ordinary afthe rest to a higher power
10 6
fairs of man in society.
99 See Bradley's Appointment, supra note 1, at 1020.
100 Id. (quoting Charles Sumner's papers (available in Harvard University

Library)).
101 Id. at 1021.
102 Friedman, supra note 6, at 1192. Bradley stated that "[n]ot a single visitor
called at my house that evening.., the whole thing is a falsehood." Id.
103
104
105

Id.
Id.

Nation, Sept. 13, 1877, at 160, col. 2.
Letter from Joseph P. Bradley to Henry B. Dawson (Oct. 28, 1882) (available
in Bradley's Papers at the New Jersey Historical Society).
106
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Bradley served on the Supreme Court for almost twenty-two
years, from 1870 to 1892."° 7 During that period, he wrote approximately 500 opinions for the Court. ° These, according to
Chief Justice Fuller, "constitute a repository of statesmanlike
views.., in the administration ofjustice, resting upon the eternal
principles of right and wrong, which will never pass into oblivion."' 0 9 Laying nineteenth century hyperbole aside, this article
will briefly address Bradley's doctrinal contributions in the following areas: the fourteenth amendment, civil rights, railroad
regulation, and the commerce clause.
A. The Fourteenth Amendment
Bradley's generation fought and won the Civil War. His
party fashioned the three post-war constitutional amendments,
which were presumably intended to incorporate the results of
that conflict into our fundamental law. In 1873, while dissenting
in the famous Slaughter-House Cases,1 0 Bradley articulated his understanding of the fourteenth amendment, therein interpreted by
the Court for the first time."'
The litigation involved the constitutionality of a Louisiana
statute that restricted all butchering in New Orleans to a certain
area and required that it be done on the premises of a particular
meat-packing corporation."' Challenging the statute, the attorney for a group of slaughterhouses argued that it was unconstitutional because it deprived the plaintiffs of their right to pursue a
lawful calling-thus denying them their liberty and property in
contravention of the fourteenth amendment.' '3 John Campbell,
however, a former member of the United States Supreme Court,
went further. He claimed that the amendment established a new
relationship between the states and the Federal Government,
with the latter now obligated to insure that rights guaranteed to
American citizens were not violated by the states." 4
107 Education of a Justice, supra note 1, at 217.
108 In Memoriam, Joseph P. Bradley, LL.D., 143 U.S. 701 app., 709 app. (1892).
109 Id.

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
See id. at 111-24 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
See id. at 38-40.
See id. at 43-44.
114 See generally id. at 44-57 (1.
Campbell's argument). Campbell's argument is
better appreciated when examined in its entirety, rather than in the somewhat truncated version that appears in the United States Reports. See 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS
110
I
112
113
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By the narrowest of margins (5-4), the Court rejected Campbell's contention. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Miller
held that the intention of the framers in adopting the new
amendments had been to deal with the ex-slave, not the general
population.1 5 He further stated that the fourteenth amendment
obligated the Federal Government to protect only those privileges and immunities that were guaranteed by the Federal Government." 6 What the butchers sought could be granted only by
the state courts and/or legislatures. 1 7 Consequently, the majority concluded that the fourteenth amendment did not apply to
8
the butchers' case." 1
Bradley rejected this viewpoint." 9 So strongly did he believe in the applicability of the new constitutional provision that
he reiterated his position three times. In his Slaughter-House dissent, Bradley argued that a statute "which prohibits a large class
of citizens from adopting a lawful employment, or from following
a lawful employment previously adopted, does deprive them of
liberty as well as property, without due process of law. Their
right of choice is a portion of their liberty; their occupation is
their property."' 120 Moreover, Bradley believed that the law
could not be justified under the police power of the state, a legitimate source of authority to which he had no objection. 121 Indeed,
he accepted "[t]hat portion of the act which require[d] all slaughter-houses to be located below the city, and to be subject to inspection." 122 Bradley stated, however, that " [t]hat portion
which allow[ed] no one but the favored company to build, own,
or have slaughter-houses [was] not a police regulation, and ha[d]
not the faintest semblance of one."' 1 23 Rather, such a provision
was "onerous, unreasonable, arbitrary, and unjust."' 1 24 Furthermore, Bradley concluded that although "[persons of the African
race] may have been the primary cause of the Amendment ...
its language [was] general, embracing all citizens, and . . .was
AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw 734 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975) (reprinting the entire brief).
115 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 71-82.
116 Id. at 74.
117 See id. at 74, 80-81.
118 Id. at 80-81.
119 See id. at 111-24 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 122 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
121 See id. at 119-20 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 120 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
123 Id.
124 Id. at 119 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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purposely so expressed."1 2 5
When the Court, shortly after the decision in the SlaughterHouse Cases, unanimously upheld an Iowa statute prohibiting the
sale of liquor, 2 6 Bradley explicitly distinguished the two cases.
In his view, the Louisiana statute challenged in the SlaughterHouse Cases restricted the butchers' rights to pursue a lawful calling, thus depriving them of property without due process of
law. 127 The Iowa statute, on the other hand, was a legitimate
manifestation of "police [regulation] intended for the preservation of the public health."' 1 28 Comparing the two statutes, Bradley concluded:
A claim of right to pursue an unlawful calling stands on very
different grounds, occupying the same platform as does a
claim of right to disregard license laws and to usurp public
franchises. It is greatly to be regretted... that this distinction
was lost sight of.. . in the decision of the Court.... 129

Ten years later, the Louisiana Legislature repealed the old monopoly.' 30 In Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co.
v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 1 the
slaughterhouse company that previously had been favored claimed
that such a repeal was unconstitutional, on the ground that the original grant in 1869 "constituted a contract for the exclusive right
mentioned in it for twenty-five years. 1 3 2 Further, because the legislative repeal impaired its obligations, the slaughterhouse company
argued that such action was void.' 3 3 Again, Mr. Justice Miller spoke
for the Court, and again he sustained the legislature by relying on
"that well-known but undefined power called the police power."' 1 34
125
126
127

Id. at 123 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
See Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1873).
Id. at 137 (Bradley, J., concurring).

128

Id.

129

Id. Speaking of the right to sell a prohibited article, Bradley further explained

that
[i]t
is toto coelo different from the right not to be deprived of property
without due process of law, or the right to pursue such lawful avocation
as a man chooses to adopt, unrestricted by tyrannical and corrupt monopolies .... Police regulations, intended for the preservation of the
public health.., are of an entirely different character. So much of the
Louisiana law as partook of this character was never objected to.
Id. at 136-37 (Bradley, J., concurring).
130 See Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent
City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., Ill U.S. 746, 748 (1884).
131 111 U.S. 746 (1884).
132
133
134

Id. at 749.
Id.

Id. at 750. Indeed, the Court stated that the legislative "duty of guarding, by
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The decision was unanimous, but in his concurring opinion, Bradley
rejected the application of the police power to the case,' 3 5 just as he
had done ten years before.
"The police regulations," Bradley insisted, "were hitched on to
the charter as a pretext. The exclusive right given to the company
had nothing of police regulation about it whatever. It was the creation of a mere monopoly, and nothing else."'' 3 6 Bradley did not
deny that various exclusive rights were within legislative purview,
such as patents or certain kinds of franchises concerning construction and operation of public works. 1 37 Furthermore, Bradley stated
that the legislature had the authority to require licenses for various
professions that called for "peculiar skill or supervision for the public welfare."'' I3 Such regulations did not create monopolies, however.13 9 Rather, the regulated professions were "open to all alike
who . . .prepare themselves with the requisite qualifications."' 40
This case, in Bradley's view, involved the fundamental proposition
"that the ordinary pursuits of life, forming the large mass of industrial avocations, are and ought to be free and open to all, subject
only to such general regulations, applying equally to all, as the general good may demand." 141 A trade monopoly was thus "an outrage
upon the liberty of the citizen as exhibited in one of its most important aspects-the liberty of pursuit."' 14 2 It was clear to Bradley that
the Louisiana grant violated the fourteenth amendment in virtually
every possible area-privileges of a citizen, deprivation of liberty
and property without due process of law, and equal protection of
the laws.
In all of these cases, beginning with the first major judicial consideration of the new amendment in 1873, Bradley argued for a
suitable laws, the health of its citizens, especially in crowded cities" represented an
obligation that could not "be sold [or] bargained away, under any circumstances, as
if it were a mere privilege which the legislator could dispose of at his pleasure." Id.
at 751.
135 See id. at 761 (Bradley, J., concurring).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 763 (Bradley, J., concurring).
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. As Walter Hamilton noted, although it was Mr. Justice Miller who wrote

the majority opinion in Crescent City, it was Field's and Bradley's concurrences that
actually shaped the law. See Hamilton, The Path of Due Process, in THE CONsTrruTiON
RECONSIDERED 178 (C. Read ed. 1938). Hamilton concluded that "under the signatures of two eminent jurists, the doctrine of due process was set down in the law
reports as an alternative reading to the police power." Id.
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breadth and vigor concerning its application that differed markedly
from what Miller espoused for the majority. He anticipated the future juridical vitality of due process. As the Court, including Miller,
retreated slowly but steadily from the narrow interpretation it espoused in 1873, it came closer to Bradley's conception of due process. As will be seen later, however, by 1890, theJustices were more
willing to expand judicial power vis-a-vis the due process clause than
Bradley.
Within three years of the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court shifted
away from the very narrow confines within which it had placed the
fourteenth amendment. In the famous case of Munn v. Illinois,'4 3 the
Court affirmed in sweeping language the authority of the states to
regulate in the public interest. 4 4 In contrast to the specific limitation placed on the fourteenth amendment only three years before,
Chief Justice Waite's opinion made no mention of the intent of the
framers to limit coverage primarily to former slaves, or of the fear
that excessive judicial use of the amendment would somehow alter
the long-standing relationship between the Court and the states.
This latter concern had been expressed by the Court in 1873.145 To
be sure, Munn lost his case, but the Court had moved much closer
to the positions taken by both his lawyer, John Jewett, and John
146
Campbell in the Slaughter-House Cases.
143
144

94 U.S. 113 (1876).

Id. at 134. For a discussion of Bradley's influence on the Munn decision, see
infra notes 215-219 and accompanying text.
145 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77-78. The Court stated:
And where it is declared that Congress shall have the power to enforce
[the fourteenth amendment], was it intended to bring within the power
of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States?
All this and more must follow, if the proposition of the plaintiffs...
be sound ....
And still further, such a construction followed by the
reversal of ... the Supreme Court of Louisiana in these cases, would
constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the
States. . . . But when . . . these consequences are so serious, so farreaching and pervading, so great a departure from the structure and
spirit of our institutions; when the effect is to fetter and degrade the
State governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress ...;
when in fact it radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the
State and Federal governments to each other. ...
We are convinced that no such results were intended by the Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by the legislatures of the
States which ratified them.
Id.
146 See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text (stating positions of Jewett
and Campbell). It is questionable whether Miller appreciated the great distance
between the Slaughter-House Cases and Munn when he wrote to Waite concerning the
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During the nineteen years between the first Slaughter-House decision and Bradley's death early in 1892, the Supreme Court charted
the perimeters of the new amendment. One year after Munn, the
Court unanimously refused to apply it in Davidson v. New Orleans,"4 7
a case involving assessments levied on privately-owned land in New
Orleans.' 4 8 Justice Miller noted the relatively few times the phrase
"due process of law" had been invoked as a restraint on the power
of theFederal Government. 1 49 He stated that although it had not
even been ten years since ratification of the fourteenth amendment,
the Court was inundated "with cases in which [it was] asked to hold
that State courts and State legislatures ha[d] deprived their own citizens of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."' 5 0 The
abundance of fourteenth amendment claims prompted Justice
Miller to conclude that the due process clause appeared to be
"looked upon as a means of bringing to . . .this court the abstract
opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in a State court of the justice
of the decision against him. '15' While he cited the Slaughter-House
Cases as controlling, 1 5 2 Miller in fact signaled a changed perception
of the Court's approach when he emphasized that "there is wisdom
...in the ascertaining of the intent and application of such an important phrase in the Federal Constitution, by the gradual process
of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for deci1 53
sion shall require."'
Bradley concurred "[iln the conclusion and general tenor" of
Miller's opinion, but still claimed that it offered too narrow a scope
for the meaning of due process of law.' 54 For him, the fourteenth
amendment entitled the Court, when judging what the clause permitted or forbade, to consider "the cause and object of the taking,
whether under the taxing power, the power of eminent domain, or
the power of assessment for local improvements, or none of
these."' 15 5 If the taking were found "to be arbitrary, oppressive, and
Munn opinion "approv[ing] unreservedly of all [Waite had] said and [thinking] it
well said and equal to the occasion which [was] a very great one." C.P. MAGRATH,
supra note 70, at 184.
147 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
148 Id. at 97.
149 Id. at 103-04.
150 Id. at 104.
151 Id.
152 See id. at 100-01.
153 Id. at 104.
154 Id. at 107 (Bradley, J., concurring).
155 Id.
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unjust," it clearly would fail the due process test. 156 Although Bradley welcomed an increased supervisory role for the Court,
he cau1 57
tioned against "interfering"with legislative discretion.
Two years later, in fact, Bradley spoke for a unanimous Court,
affirming that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws
and the same remedies."' 5 8 He stated that "[e]ach State prescribes
its own modes ofjudicial proceedings."' 5 9 In 1886, Bradley silently
concurred with Chief Justice Waite's warning that the "power of
limitation or regulation is [not] itself without limit. This power to
regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the
0
equivalent of confiscation."16
In 1890, a divided Court finally made explicit what the Justices
had been implying (albeit in varying combinations) since 1873"the fairness and reasonableness" of a state commission's decisions
'
were indeed "a proper matter for the courts." 161
Although Mr. Justice Blatchford tried to show by quoting Waite's warning that the
Court was only moving in a consistent and well-established doctrinal direction, in fact, the holding in Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Railway v. Minnesota 162 broke new constitutional ground. 163 The is-

sue of the reasonableness of a commission's or legislature's action
had at last become clothed in the raiment of due process, to be fitted
by the Justices of the Supreme Court and displayed, as it were,
within the Constitution itself." The decision, which paved the way
"for judicial supervision of state regulation,' ' 165 was a "major turn156

Id.

157 Id. at 107-08 (Bradley, J., concurring).
158

Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879).

159 Id. When Mr. Justice Field, in the 1885 case of Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S.

27 (1885), reiterated this point by holding that the amendment was not designed to
interfere with the police power of the state, he spoke for a unanimous Court and
did not deem it necessary to cite any previous holding whatsoever. See id. at 30-31.
160 Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886). The Court further
stated that "[u]nder pretence [sic] of regulating fares and freights, the State cannot
require a railroad corporation to carry persons or property without reward; neither
can it do that which in law amounts to a taking of private property for public use
without just compensation, or without due process of law." Id.
161

J.

SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO A

1890-1920, at 19 (1978).
(1890).
163 SeeJ. SEMONCHE, supra note 161, at 19-20.
164 See id.
165 A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE
BENCH, 1887-1895, at 42 (1960, reprint 1976).
CHANGING SOCIETY,
162 134 U.S. 418

OF LAw: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND
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ing point" in American constitutional law. 16 6 In accepting such supervision, the Court began a trend toward invalidating statutes on
substantive due process grounds. This trend, which culminated in
the Court-packing crisis of the late 1930's, ended with the decision
16 7
in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.
Bradley had a great deal to do with bringing the Court to the
point it had reached prior to Chicago, Milwaukee. Although he had
concurred in the gradual shift in direction, he strongly dissented in
Chicago, Milwaukee and insisted that the issue of the reasonableness
of railroad charges was primarily a legislative matter. 68 Further, he
was untroubled by the fact that his position eliminated the possibility of judicial appeals from commission decisions. 169 He stated:
"There must be a final tribunal somewhere for deciding every question in the world. Injustice may take place in all tribunals. All
human institutions are imperfect-courts as well as commissions
and legislatures."' 7 Why did Bradley resist as the Court "slowly
backed into an acceptance of substantive due process"? 7 By the
time of this decision, he had been on the Bench for twenty years and
had acquired a justified reputation as a tough legal thinker, undaunted by minute details of the law. 1 72 Although in some areas,
such as civil rights, he was unable to take a broad perspective, he
may well have sensed where the Court's interest in substantive due
process might lead. He was certainly aware of the marked shift in
the Justices' approach since the Slaughter-House Cases.
B. Civil Rights
In the area of civil rights, two opinions by Bradley have not
been well-regarded by scholars-his concurrence in Bradwell v.
1 74
Illinois1 73 and the majority opinion in the Civil Rights Cases.
The Bradwell case concerned the efforts of a woman, Myra
Bradwell, to gain admittance to the Illinois Bar.175 Rebuffed by
the Illinois Supreme Court in a graceful yet condescending deci166 Id. at 41. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Blatchford neither mentioned
nor cited Munn. SeeJ. LURIE, LAW AND THE NATION, 1865-1912, at 25 (1983).
167 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
168 See Chicago, Milwaukee, 134 U.S. at 461 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
169 See id. at 465 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
170 Id.
171 J. SEMONCHE, supra note 161, at 34.
172 See id.
173 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
174 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
175 Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 130.
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sion, 17 6 she appealed to the United States Supreme Court 1 77 -

where the case was argued during the same Term as the SlaughterHouse Cases. Bradwell argued that the fourteenth amendment
prevented the state from abridging her privileges and immunities, one of which was surely the right to practice her chosen calling.17 8 She could well have cited Bradley's vigorous dissenting
opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases to emphasize this point. It
probably would have made no difference concerning the outcome, however. Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for eight members
of the Court, followed the reasoning of the Slaughter-House Cases
majority, holding that it was only privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States "which a State is forbidden to
abridge [and that] the right to admission to practice in the courts
of a State is not one of them.' ' 79 Bradley not only agreed with
the decision, but added a concurring opinion rejecting any applicability of the fourteenth amendment to the case.'
Given his
ringing affirmation of the right to choose one's calling in the earlier butcher litigation, how can his equally emphatic denial of
Bradwell's position be explained?
Bradley appears to have been very much a child of his times.
He strongly believed in an ordered universe, which in turn resulted in an ordered society with men and women filling expected roles. The values he articulated in the Slaughter-House
Cases were, from his viewpoint, perfectly consistent with what he
said in Bradwell. It was logical to expect men to be able to work at
whatever calling they chose, unencumbered by inappropriate and
improper regulation. Law had to reflect nature, however, and
"[i]n the nature of things it is not every citizen of every age, sex,
and condition that is qualified for every calling and position." 181
There was no doubt that the police power could "prescribe regulations founded on nature, reason, and experience for the due
admission of qualified persons to professions and callings demanding special skill and confidence."' 8 2 When one further considered "the peculiar characteristics, destiny, and mission of
woman," the Illinois practice, unlike the Louisiana legislation,
See In re Bradwell, 55 Ill.
535 (1869).
177 Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 133.
178 Id. at 140 (Bradley, J., concurring).
179 Id. at 139.
180 See id. at 139-42 (Bradley, J., concurring).
181 Id. at 142 (Bradley, J, concurring).
182 Id.
176
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was not unreasonable.' 8 3 After all, Bradley reasoned, the chief
purpose of women was "to fulfil the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother. This is the law of the creator. And the rules of
civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of
things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases."' 4 One
cannot take Bradley out of his times, but one need not accept his
values in order to understand them. Perhaps the best comment
on his concurrence in Bradwell came from a writer in the Boston
Daily Advertiser, who observed that "Judge Bradley's opinion
seemed to cause no little amusement upon the Bench and on the
85
Bar."1

One author, John Scott, argues that Bradley's 1873 dissent
in the Slaughter-House Cases cannot be reconciled with his opinion
for the Court in the Civil Rights Cases, which was decided ten years
later.' 6 Writing for the majority in the Civil Rights Cases, Bradley
struck down a civil rights act that made it illegal to deny any person access to inns, theaters, and other public places based on
race.1

7

Bradley stated that

[i]t would be running the slavery argument into the ground to
make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person
may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to
the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to
his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of interi8
course or business.'

Scott reasons that Bradley somehow changed his mind as a result of
his role in the Electoral Commission Compromise of 1877.89 This
author believes, however, that Bradley's views on racial matters remained very consistent from 1862 through 1890. His emphasis on
certain categories of rights being higher than others explains his position, although he can indeed be accused of sometimes having a
tendency toward a hardening of the categories.
Bradley's hierarchy of values concerning civil rights can be seen
Id.
Id. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring).
2 C. WARREN, supra note 66, at 550 n. 1 (citations omitted). "As a demonstration of man's superior fitness for the law," concludes Charles Fairman, "this opinion was not a shining example." 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
183
184
185

THE UNITD STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION:

1864-88, at 1366 (1971). Two

months after Bradley's death, Mrs. Bradwell was admitted to the bar of the
Supreme Court. See id. at 1367.
186 See Scott, Justice Bradley's Evolving Concept of the Fourteenth Amendment from the
Slaughter-House Cases to the Civil Rights Cases, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 552, 562-63 (1971).
187 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10.
188
189

Id. at 24-25.
See Scott, supra note 186, at 565-69.
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by comparing his dissent in Blyew v. United States' 90 with his opinion
for the Court in the Civil Rights Cases.' 9 ' The Blyew case involved the
particularly brutal murder in Kentucky of an elderly, blind, black
woman.' 9 2 The crime had been witnessed by several of her relatives,' 9 3 but Kentucky law forbade a black to testify at the trial of a
white defendant.' 9 4 Therefore, Federal authorities using section 3
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866' 9 ' sought to move the case into Federal court. 196 In an opinion for the United States Supreme Court
that seems less than persuasive, Mr. Justice Strong ruled that the
case did not come within the perimeters of the Federal statute because the law applied only to persons "affected by the cause," a category that did not include witnesses.197 Bradley dissented on the
grounds that the case involved
an inestimable right, that of invoking the penalties of the law
upon those who criminally or feloniously attack our persons or
our property....
To deprive a whole class . . . of this right, to refuse their
evidence and their sworn complaints, is to brand them with a
badge of slavery; is to expose them to wanton insults and
fiendish assaults; is to leave their lives, their families, and their
property unprotected by law.198
Bradley concluded that this right was part of the "civil liberty" that
had come with the abolition of slavery. 199
The passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1875,20o only three years
later, brought forth a very different response from Bradley. His attitude toward racial matters involving social functions rather than
political rights should be understood. The right to expect the legal
order to insure one's ability to testify as a witness was very different
and far more important, in.Bradley's view, than a desire on the part
of blacks to sit next to whites while dining. The former was a vital
component of one's privileges as a citizen, a right obviously to be
190 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872).
191 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
192 See Blyew, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 584-85.
193 Id. at 584.
194 Id. at 581.
195 Ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
196 See Blyew, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 587.
197 Id. at 592. A contrary ruling, according to Justice Strong, would mean "that
in any suit between white citizens, jurisdiction might be taken by the Federal courts
whenever it was alleged that a citizen of the African race was or might be an important witness. And such an allegation might always be made." Id.
198 Id. at 598-99 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 601 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
200 Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
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protected by the legal order. The other was a matter of social
preference.
In his copybook, sometime between 1875 and 1876, Bradley
wrote a brief memorandum of his thinking on the 1875 statute. 20
He stated:
Surely Congress cannot guarantee to the colored people admission to every place of gathering and amusement. To deprive white people of the right of choosing their own company
would be to introduce another kind of slavery. The civil rights
bill had already guaranteed to the blacks the right of buying,
selling and holding property, and of equal protection
of the
20 2
laws. Are not these the essentials of freedom?
For Bradley, and I suspect for the vast majority of his circle of acquaintances, to ask such a question was to answer it. He insisted
further that
[i]t never can be endured that the white shall be compelled to
lodge and eat and sit with the negro. The latter can have his
freedom and all legal and essential privileges without that.
The antipathy of race cannot be crushed and annihilated by
legal enactment. The Constitutional amendments
were never
20 3
intended to aim at such an impossibility.
Bradley concluded his statement by emphasizing that "surely it is no
deprivation of civil rights to give each race the right to choose their
20 4
own company."
It should therefore come as no surprise to read Bradley's opinion for the Court in the Civil Rights Cases, handed down in 1883. He
had not changed his mind at all, but had merely rearticulated sentiments he had long held. Indeed, his views on "state action" were
perfectly compatible with his dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases ten
years earlier. He had no doubt that the fourteenth amendment applied to state action. Equally certain for the Justice was the conviction that the actions complained of in these cases in no way
constituted state action. Private discrimination seemed perfectly appropriate to him. It should be noted that every Justice who had participated in the Slaughter-House Cases and who was still on the Bench
voted with Bradley. It may well be that historians have made too
much of the Compromise of 1877 and Hayes's Southern strategy,
with the resultant rush to regional reconciliation. Furthermore,
201 See R. Whiteside,JusticeJoseph Bradley and the Reconstruction Amendments
264 (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation).
202 Id.
203 Id.
204

Id. at 265.
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Bradley is often mistakenly identified as the executor of this "agreement" in the form of the 1883 decision. Abolition of slavery and the
tools used to maintain it did not imply abolition of racial prejudices.
In this context, Mr. Justice Bradley merely echoed in 1883 what congressional candidate Bradley had stated in 1862.205
Bradwell and the Civil Rights Cases are certainly no tribute to
Bradley as a civil libertarian. One other case, however, is of much
greater positive significance. In the landmark case of Boyd v. United
States,2 ° 6 Bradley explored the scope of the fourth amendment and
its relationship to the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment. 20 7 He rejected the claim "that the seizure of a man's private
books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially
20 8
different from compelling him to be a witness against himself.
Indeed, in Bradley's view, "a compulsory production of the private
books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited...
compel[s] him to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment . . .and is the equivalent of a search and
seizure-and an unreasonable search and seizure-within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. ' 20 9 The motive and scope of the
search were not the issues. "[I]llegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their first footing . . . by silent approaches and slight
deviations from legal modes of procedures .... It is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and
2 10
against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
C.

Railroad Regulation

It was in the areas of railroad regulation and interpretation
of the commerce clause that Bradley especially distinguished
himself. His independent attitude toward railroads, given his
long background of intimate association with the Camden and
Amboy Railroad Company, was noteworthy and probably, from
the railroads' viewpoint, very unexpected.2 1 1 In 1873, Bradley
205

See supra text accompanying notes 46-52 (discussing Bradley's sentiments in

1862).
206 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
207 See id. at 621-22.
208 Id. at 633.
209 Id. at 634-35.
210 Id. at 635. Replete with scholarly footnotes, this opinion is a good example of
Bradley's deep interest in legal/historical research. See id. at 622-38.
211 See Friedman, supra note 6, at 1188-89. Bradley's independence is yet another
example of the difficulty in using past legal practice to predict future judicial performance. One way some American Presidents (including the incumbent) have
tried to resolve this problem in their Supreme Court appointments is by selecting
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held for a unanimous Court that a common carrier could not
"stipulate for exemption from responsibility for . . . negligence. ' 21 2 The truth, he pointedly noted, was that "[t]he carrier
and his customer do not stand on a footing of equality. '2 13 Brad-

ley believed that the economic clout of railroad corporations
214
should not permit them to "abdicate their essential duties.
Bradley's major role in formulating the doctrine in Munn v.
Illinois2 15 has been so well-documented 21 6 that minimal discus-

sion is needed here. Suffice it to state that it was Bradley who
(with a strong interest in antiquarian legal sources) called the
writing of Lord Hale to the attention of Chief Justice Waite.2 17
He noted in a memorandum "that whenever a particular employment, or a business establishment becomes a matter of public
consequence so as to affect the whole public and to become a
'common charge,' it is subject to legislative regulation and control. Whatever affects the community at large ought to be subject
to such regulation. "218 These sentiments came from the former
only sitting judges, who presumably, by their past decisions, have indicated a somewhat distinct juridical outlook. On the other hand, this method is also far from
foolproof-as the later career of Mr. Justice Brennan (as contrasted with New
Jersey Supreme Court Justice Brennan) well reveals.
212 Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 384 (1873).
213 Id. at 379. Bradley further stated: "The business [of the common carriers] is
mostly concentrated in a few powerful corporations, whose position in the body
politic enables them to control it. They do, in fact, control it, and impose such
conditions upon travel and transportation as they see fit, which the public is compelled to accept." Id. at 380.
214 Fairman, Mr.Justice Bradley, in MR. JUSTICE 85 (A. Dunham & P. Kurland eds.
1964).
215 For a discussion of the Munn case, see supra notes 143-146 and accompanying
text.
216 See, e.g., Fairman, The So-Called Granger Cases, Lord Hale, and Justice Bradley, 5
STAN. L. REV. 587 (1953).
217 See Fairman, supra note 214, at 587-92. There seems little doubt that Bradley's memorandum to Chief Justice Waite convinced Waite to cite Hale. Harry
Scheiber has demonstrated conclusively, however, that Hale and his doctrines were
known to American lawyers and judges by the 1870's. See Scheiber, The Road to
Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, in LAW IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 329 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971).
218 J. Bradley, Outline of My Views on the Subject of the Granger Cases (undated) (available in Bradley's Papers at the New Jersey Historical Society). In this
memorandum, Bradley went on to denounce the railroads in language that, given
his previous association with the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company, seems
unusually harsh. Perhaps his judgment was based upon his experience as a successful railroad attorney. He wrote the following of the railroads:
[T]here are in this country no more absolute monopolies of public service than [the railroads] are. The public stands on no equality with
them. They have every thing in their own hands.... They have effectually excluded all other modes of travel and transportation. They enjoy
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chief counsel and director of one of the most notorious railroads
in the Northeast. It is views such as these that led Felix Frankfurter to conclude "that Bradley was a striking disproof of the
theory of economic determinism, because he, who by his previous experience would supposedly reflect the bias of financial
power, was as free from it as any judge and indeed much more

radical.'

'219

D. Commerce Clause
In interpreting the scope of the commerce clause, Bradley
demonstrated an impressive sensitivity toward the needs of an
effective federalism. He explored with skill and insight the controversial boundaries between Federal regulation of interstate
commerce and the state taxing power.2 20 In the matter of interstate commerce, Bradley wrote in 1887 that "the United States
are but one country, and are and must be subject to one system
of regulations, and not to a multitude of systems." '2 2' Thus,
when Tennessee levied a tax on "drummers"-representatives or
agents of a company not located within the state-Bradley used
the ensuing case as a vehicle for expanding the holding of Welton
V. Missouri,2 2 2 decided in 1876. In that case, Mr. Justice Field had
spoken for a unanimous Court and had held that a tax levied
upon peddlers who were selling goods not made in Missouri was
unconstitutional.2 23 Eleven years later, in Robbins v. Shelby County
Taxing District,22 4 Bradley ruled that "to tax the sale of... goods,
or the offer to sell them, before they are brought into the state
...seems to us clearly a tax on interstate commerce itself."' 225
public franchises of the most valuable character. They impose a common charge of greater value to themselves and burden to the public
than any other which exists in the present age.
Id.

219 J. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 312 (1975).
220 See, e.g., Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887);

Coe v.
Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886); Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622 (1885).
221 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 494 (1887).
222 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
223 Id. at 282.
224 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
225 Id. at 497. Bradley further stated:
The truth is, that, in numberless instances, the most feasible, if not
the only practicable, way for the merchant or manufacturer to obtain
orders in other states is to obtain them by personal application, either
by himself, or by some one employed for that purpose.... If the right
[of state taxation] exists, any New York or Chicago merchant visiting
New Orleans or Jacksonville, for pleasure or for his health, and casually
taking an order for goods to be sent from his warehouse, could be made

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY

1986]

371

"It seems to be forgotten," Bradley stated, "that the people of
this country are citizens of the United States, as well as of the
individual states, and that they have some rights under the Constitution and laws of the former independent of the22 6latter, and
free from any interference or restraint from them.In Bradley's judicial hierarchy of values, an "untrammelled"
interstate commerce, to use Mr. Justice Field's phrase,22 7 ranked
extremely high. Thus, he concurred in the 1877 case of Hall v.
DeCuir,22 8 in which Chief Justice Waite declared a Louisiana reconstruction statute that mandated integrated facilities on steamers plying the Mississippi to be an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce. 229 A similar case came before the Court
thirteen years later. 23 0 The litigation in that case focused on a
Mississippi law that required railroads to provide segregated
cars. 23 1 Reflecting perhaps the changing attitude toward race relations, the Court, through Mr. Justice Brewer, sustained the statute, 2seeking
somewhat unsuccessfully to distinguish it from De
32
Cuir.

Bradley dissented on the specific ground that the law was

an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.233

IV.

THE BRADLEY PERSONALITY

These admittedly impressionistic paragraphs in no way do
complete justice to Bradley's twenty-two years on the Court. Of
Grant's four appointments to the Supreme Court, Bradley was
the strongest in intellect and learning. Thoroughly familiar with
the American, English, and Continental legal systems, he
brought added strength to his decisions through practical experience in the world of business and a familiarity with many other
fields, such as mathematics, philosophy, and natural sciences. He
reveled in tracking a legal doctrine as far back as he could
through the sources. Since his private library contained about
16,000 volumes, 234 he was able to provide notable footnotes and
liable to pay a tax for so doing, or be convicted of a misdemeanor for
not having taken out a license.
Id. at 495-96.
226 Id. at 496-97.

227 See Welton, 91 U.S. at 282.
228 95 U.S. 485 (1877).

229 Id. at 488.

230 See Louisville, N.O. & Tex. Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890).
231 Id. at 588.
232 See id. at 589-91.
233 Id. at 595 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
234 Friedman, supra note 6, at 1199.
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citations for some of his opinions. For example, in an 1890 opinion involving the Mormon Church, Bradley traced the doctrine of
cy-pres back to the Pandects ofJustinian and cited Latin,
French,
235
and Spanish sources, including a footnote in French!
He was equally at home when expounding on the appropriate methods for calculating the earnings of a railroad or discussing the intricacies of patent litigation, an area in which he
frequently spoke for the Court. 236 A Rutgers classmate who remained friends with Bradley for more than fifty years noted that
he had a compulsion "not only to be, but to know." '2 7 If Bradley
did not dominate his equally strong-minded colleagues, Miller
and Field, he certainly held his own.2 3 8 Indeed, Miller wrote that
Bradley "is a queer man. As Judge Strong said the other day, 'If
there is a principle on which a case can be decided that no one
else has thought of it has for that reason a charm for him.' And
so I suppose he is in other matters of life."' 2 39 Nevertheless,

Miller believed that given "some allowance for eccentricity
[Bradley] is a useful and valuable man on the bench. ' 240 A friend
of Bradley observed that as with "most men who resemble him in
the possession of logical power and habit, he had little or no def235 See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 52-53 & n.1 (1890).
236 For examples of Bradley's patent opinions, see Lawther v. Hamilton, 124 U.S.
1 (1888); Powder Co. v. Powder Works, 98 U.S. 126 (1878); Cochrane v. Deener,
94 U.S. 780 (1876).
237 See Parker, supra note 35, at 157.
238 The relationship between Samuel F. Miller and Bradley appears to have been
one of respect rather than regard. One quality that Miller did possess, however,
apparently was not vouchsafed to Bradley-a sense of humor. "The trouble with
Bradley," noted Miller, "is that he does not recognize my intellectual preeminence." J. LASH, supra note 219, at 312. One contemporary told "of Miller holding
court in Saint Louis one sultry day, collar and cravat loosened, working a palm-leaf
fan, and shifting uneasily in his seat. Finally-'Damn it, Brown, come to the point'
'What point, your Honor?' 'I don't know; any point; some point.'" C. FAIRMAN,
supra note 64, at 417. We can only wonder what both Justices thought of the following poem that appeared in a New York newspaper in February, 1890 (the time
of the centennial celebration of the Supreme Court, held at the Metropolitan Opera
House in New York City).
We are the dread Judicial Nine, who rank high over all.
We sit upon a narrow bench in a little stuffy hall.
We tinker Constitutions and decisions we reverse.
And when a muddle's very bad, we often make it worse.
3 Scrapbooks, compiled by the clerk's office of the United States Supreme Court
(quoting the N.Y. Morning Journal, Feb. 5, 1890) (available in the National
Archives Records, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as Scrapbooks].
239 C. FAIRMAN, supra note 64, at 362.
240

Id. at 277.
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erence for the mere opinion of others." 2 4 '
Bradley appears to have been a somewhat irascible person,
of whom one acquaintance of many years, Cortlandt Parker,
wrote: "He was amusingly petulant-naturally eccentric; and he
had stimulated eccentricity by its indulgence throughout his
life."2'4 2 "Beyond all question," concluded Parker, "he was a
'
most peculiar man." 243
One scholar recently described Bradley
as having "a tight-lipped face and a nasty temper. His normal
expression came perilously close to a frown. ' 2 4 4 This scholar
concluded that his "rigid personality was not appealing. "245 Perhaps the best description of this Judge came from a contemporary observer of the Court in 1890:
Bradley is a little dried-up anatomy of a man .... He has a big
nose, sharp bright little eyes, iron gray hair and a pair of
tightly closed lips. His skin hangs in wrinkles and all of his fat
has long since gone to figures and judicial decisions. He is
seventy-seven years old, but there is a fair chance for his lasting at least twenty-three years longer. There is not much of
him to die, and when his soul is disembodied it will not be
much freer than it is now.2 4 6
Notwithstanding his seemingly unappealing personality, Bradley
was praised by another contemporary as being "better read in the
law than almost any other man upon the bench. He has a greater
knowledge of the authorities, and can quote more of them from
memory than perhaps any other member of the legal profession in
24 7

the country.

V.

CONCLUSION

Was Bradley a great Justice? There is no doubt that he had
241
242
243

Parker, supra note 35, at 157.

245
246

Id. at 34.

Id. at 158.

Id. Fairman relates how on one occasion
Mrs. Bradley kept the Justice waiting so that they missed the train by
insisting that he ...put on a brand new pair of trousers. On the return
to the house, he was found with a pen-knife in his hand slashing the new
trousers to shreds and mumbling 'you will never compel me to miss another train.'
Fairman, supra note 214, at 81 (footnote omitted).
244 J.SEMONCHE, supra note 161, at 5 (footnote omitted).
3 Scrapbooks, supra note 238, at 13 (quoting a dispatch signed by Frank Carpenter, Jan. 31, 1890). Another clipping described Bradley as "a small, dried up
little man, all nerve and brain, as cleanly shaved as a monk, and a great stickler for
dignity and decorum." Id. at 33 (quoting N.Y. Recorder, Feb. 18, 1891).
247 1 Scrapbooks, supra note 238 (quoting unentitled news clipping).
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superb legal qualifications and that he was an outstanding technician of the law. He brought to his decisions a seasoned practicality in business affairs. It is not surprising that his greatest
opinions in terms of influence appear to have been in the area of
commercial regulation. Yet, in other fields of the law that later
generations have considered more important than interstate
commerce, Bradley was unable to transcend the limits of his own
time. The truly great judge must be able to do that, by somehow
"nudging" the future into some sort of shape that is compatible
with, but different from, the past.
A man of strong convictions, Bradley did not hesitate to dissent from his colleagues when he deemed it appropriate.248 On
some occasions, his dissents later become the law. 2 49 Bradley
passionately believed in progress and in the perfectibility of
man.25" He was unable, however, to translate this faith into judicial doctrine that went beyond race and gender. "He had," concluded Leon Friedman, "little of the skepticism and tolerance of
a Holmes and came to a conclusion about a law or legal rule because it was the right law or rule under the circumstances, and not
because imperfect men should be allowed to bungle their way
freely within broad limits of government." 25 ' There seems to be
no reason to augment or diminish the verdict on Mr. Justice
Bradley that appeared in the Washington Post on January 23, 1892,
the day after his death: He "was a man of profound and varied
learning, legal acumen, and moral rectitude.

'2 52

Whether these

248 According to Mr. Justice Blatchford, through 1890 "Bradley was as much a
dissenter as Field had been (33% for Bradley, 35% for Field)." Friedman, supra
note 6, at 1196. It seems reasonable to conclude that he did not hesitate to dissent
when he felt it appropriate. Charles E. Hughes remarked to Felix Frankfurter that
the Supreme Court in "the days of Bradley and Harlan... was a brutal Court in its
personal relations. I heard that they actually shook fists at one another." J. LASH,
supra note 219, at 313. This description may be contrasted with a statement made
by Holmes to Frankfurter in 1920: "I have a little case, . . . whether it will go or not
I don't know. As originally written it had a tiny pair of testicles-but the scruples of
my brethren have caused their removal and it sings in a very soft voice now." L.
BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER

194 (1984).

For example, in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486-87
(1939), the Court held that the Federal Government could tax the salary of a state
official, a position Bradley had maintained in dissent more than 60 years before. See
Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 128-29 (1870) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
250 Some of the essays included in the collection of Bradley's writings published
by his son are entitled "Truth," "Variety of Intellectual Capacities," "Will: SelfControl," "Experience, or Self-Improvement," and "Principles Should Be Fixed."
MISCELLANEOUS WRrTNGS, supra note 48, at iv.
251 Friedman, supra note 6, at 1200.
252 3 Scrapbooks, supra note 238, at 40-41 (quoting obituary notice in Wash. Post,
Jan. 23, 1892).
249
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qualities were sufficient to distinguish him as a great Justice must
be decided by each generation in the light of its perceptions of
the past and aspirations for the future.

